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Abstract
We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multi-
ple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the
amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized
on all the issues. Examples of such games are several rms competing in multiple
markets, and countries negotiating both a trade agreement (through, e.g., WTO)
and an environmental agreement (e.g., Kyoto Protocol). We propose a way to ex-
tend (Shapley) values for partition function games to issue-externality games. We
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characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our
more general environment. The solution concept that we propose can be applied
to many interesting games, including intertemporal situations where players meet
sequentially.
JEL Classication numbers: C71, D62.
Keywords: externalities, cooperative game theory, Shapley value, linked issues.
1 Introduction
A central question in game theory is how to share the joint surplus among players when
they cooperate. For games in characteristic form where the worth of a coalition depends
only on the composition of this coalition, Shapley (1953) uses an axiomatic approach to
characterize the unique value or payo¤ allocation that satises the properties (axioms)
of e¢ ciency, linearity, anonymity, and dummy player. This value can also be seen as an
operator that assigns an expected marginal contribution to each player in a game with
respect to a uniform distribution over the set of all permutations on the set of players.
Alternatively, the Shapley value can be obtained as the sum of the dividends that accrue
for a player from the various coalitions in which he could participate (Harsanyi, 1959)
and through the potential approach proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).
Even though the Shapley value possesses many desirable properties and has inspired a
host of studies, it cannot be applied to situations where externalities are present. In many
economic situations, the worth of a coalition of players depends not only on the members
of that coalition but also on how the rest of the players are organized. For example, in the
context of international trade, the welfare of a trade union depends on whether the outside
countries form other trade unions; in an oligopolistic market the prots of a cartel depend
not only on the composition of this cartel but also on the organization of other rms in
the market. As a natural extension of the games in characteristic form, Thrall and Lucas
(1963) introduced games in partition function form in which the worth of a coalition is
determined by the partition of the remaining players. Using the axiomatic approach, a
number of authors have proposed extensions of the Shapley value for games in partition
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function form. Contributions in this line of research include the works of Myerson (1977),
Bolger (1989), Feldman (1996), Albizuri, Arin and Rubio (2005), Macho-Stadler, Pérez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2007), Pham Do and Norde (2007), McQuillin (2009), and Dutta,
Ehlers and Kar (2010).1
The worth of a coalition in a partition function game depends only on the organization
of all players in this game. Thus, if di¤erent games correspond to di¤erent issues under
consideration, then it is taken for granted that all issues are independent and thus can
be analyzed separately. However, there are interesting economic situations with multiple
linked issues in that the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the
players are organized on all the issues. Put di¤erently, in these environments, there are
not only multiple issues but also externalities across these issues. Consider, for instance,
several rms competing in multiple markets. Cooperation in one market can have an
impact on the prots obtained in the other markets either through the cost functions or
through the demand functions (due to product complementarity/substitutability). Al-
ternatively, consider countries negotiating both a trade agreement (through, e.g., WTO)
and an environmental agreement (e.g., Kyoto Protocol). These two issues, namely trade
and environment, are linked through production. For example, the accelerated growth
triggered by trade liberalization supported by the WTO is likely to raise CO2 emissions,
making it more di¢ cult for the participants in the environmental agreement to comply
with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
In situations such as described above, one can no longer consider each issue in isolation
in order to determine the value or the payo¤ allocation. The alternative approach of
simply adding up the two issues and then computing the value of each player also
seems erroneous as it imposes that players be organized in the same way or form the same
coalitions on di¤erent issues. In this paper we introduce a value that takes into account
the externalities that the formation of coalitions on one issue may create on the worth of
all the coalitions on the other issues.
We take the axiomatic approach and propose an extension of the Shapley value to
games where there are externalities both within and across issues. First, we present a
1Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2006) provided mechanisms that implement a family
of extensions of the Shapley value for games in partition function form.
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denition of issue-externality games, as a natural extension of the partition form games to
environments with linked issues.2 We consider scenarios where forming the grand coalition
on the set of all issues jointly is the e¢ cient outcome and the worth must be allocated
to all the players.3 This leads us to include, for convenience, the usual e¢ ciency axiom
in the denition of value.4 Our value concept builds on a reference value for partition
function games. That is, we extend some reference value that has been proposed to
deal with only within-issue externalities to environments where externalities across issues
are also present. We show that the classic axioms of linearity, player anonymity, and
dummy player can be easily extended from partition function games to issue-externality
games. Also the strong dummy property, which captures the idea that when dummy
players are added to or excluded from a game the remaining players should receive the
same payo¤s, extends to issue-externality games. In addition, we show that when the
above axioms hold for the reference value, our extension of the Shapley value satises the
additional properties of issue symmetry and dummy issue (which mirror, with respect to
issues, the axioms of dummy player and player anonymity), as well as two axioms that
capture the way inter-issue externalities are considered: issue-externality anonymity and
issue-externality symmetry.
Our main result is that the afore-mentioned axioms characterize our proposed value:
If a value for issue-externality games satises the axioms of linearity, player anonymity,
strong dummy player, issue symmetry, dummy issue, issue-externality anonymity, and
2Nax (2014) considers a similar class of games that he calls multiple membership games. His approach
is, however, di¤erent from ours since he focuses on extending the core allocation proposed by Bloch and
de Clippel (2010) for combined games, to games with externalities across issues (multiple membership
games).
3The e¢ ciency axiom on issue-externality games does not require that the formation of the grand
coalition on a particular issue maximizes the total value in that issue. It may be the case that forming
the grand coalition on an issue is e¢ cient because it maximizes the joint value of all the issues although
it does not maximize the value on that issue.
4See Maskin (2003) and de Clippel and Serrano (2008) for a discussion of the possible consequences
of including externalities on the e¢ ciency of the outcome. Maskin (2003) suggests that in situations in
which coalitions generate signicant positive externalities, we should not expect that the grand coalition
will form. This might be a reason why the Shapley value and the core have not been used in settings
with externalities.
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issue-externality symmetry, then it can be obtained as an extension (using our proce-
dure) of a value for partition function games that satises the axioms of linearity, player
anonymity and strong dummy player.
The solution concept that we propose can be applied to many interesting games,
including intertemporal situations where players meet sequentially.5 In these games, each
date at which players make decisions can be associated to an issue. Therefore, a
multi-stage game corresponds to a game with several issues. When the payo¤s that the
players may obtain at a stage depend on the decisions taken at previous periods, the
game is an issue-externality game. Additionally, our approach provides values even for
situations where the set of active players in a certain period may change over time as a
function of the coalitions formed by the active players at earlier periods.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents issue-externality games to
capture externalities within and across issues. Section 3 introduces our proposed value
concept. Section 4 presents the axioms. Section 5 establishes the relationship between
the axioms satised by the value for partition function games and those satised by
the proposed value for issue-externality games. The latter section also states our main
characterization result and it applies it to one particular value for partition function games.
Section 6 illustrates our value concept through two examples and Section 7 concludes. The
proofs of all the results are delineated in the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we formulate issue-externality games with transferable payo¤s that
generalize partition function games. We denote by N = f1; :::; ng the set of players. A
coalition S is a subset of players, that is, S  N . We denote by P a partition (coalition
structure) of the set of players N and, for technical convenience, we follow the convention
that the empty set ; is in P for every partition P . The set of all partitions of N is denoted
by P.
In our environment, players can cooperate on several issues. We denote by A the
5Beja and Gilboa (1990) propose a class of two-stage gamesand characterize all the semivalues in
this class of games.
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nite set of issues the players are concerned with. Players can form di¤erent coalitions
and partitions on di¤erent issues. Hence, to represent the way in which the players are
organized, we need to specify a partition of N for each issue. Let PA = (P a)a2A denote
a vector of jAj partitions of the set N , indexed by issues in A and PA denote the set of
vectors of jAj partitions of N .6
An embedded coalition is a triplet (S; a;PA), where S is a coalition, a is an issue,
and PA is a vector of jAj partitions of N such that S 2 P a, where P a is the component
(partition) in PA that corresponds to issue a. An embedded coalition, hence, species a
coalition S formed on an issue a together with the structures of coalitions formed by all
the players on all issues PA such that coalition S is an element of the partition on issue
a. ECL(N;A) is the set of all embedded coalitions for a given set of players N and a set
of issues A.
We represent the worth that a group of players can achieve through a real-valued
function v : ECL(N;A) ! R that associates a real number to each embedded coalition.
Hence, v(S; a;PA); with a 2 A, S 2 P a and PA 2 PA, is the total utility available
for division among members of coalition S in issue a when the players are organized on
the issues in A according to the partition vector PA: We assume that the value function
satises v(;; a;PA) = 0 for all a 2 A and PA 2 PA. The game (N;A; v) is called an
issue-externality game. We denote G as the set of such games.
Example 1 presents a game with externalities across issues with two players, N =
f1; 2g; and two issues, A = fa; bg.
6 j
j denotes the cardinality of any set 
.
6
# a b! f1g; f2g f1; 2g
f1g; f2g 2; 2 5
f1; 2g 1; 4
7
6
3; 1
5
v(f1; 2g; a; (ff1; 2gg; ff1g; f2gg| {z }
PA
))
2; 4

Table 1: Example 1
We say that the game (N;A; v) has no externalities within issues if the worth of a
coalition S on any issue a is independent of the way the rest of the players are organized
on that issue. Otherwise, the game has externalities within issues. Formally,7
Denition 1 The game (N;A; v) has externalities within issue a 2 A if for some PAna 2
PAna; P a; Oa 2 P ; and S 2 P a \Oa, we have v  S; a;  P a; PAna 6= v  S; a;  Oa; PAna :
When a game has externalities within issues, the worth of a coalition on issue a depends
on the organization of the other players on this issue. In a multi-issue environment, the
worth of a coalition S formed on a particular issue a may depend not only on the way the
rest of the players are organized on issue a but also on the organization of all players on
the other issues. When this happens, we say that the game exhibits externalities across
issues. More formally:
Denition 2 The game (N;A; v) has externalities across issues if for some a 2 A, P a 2
P, S 2 P a, and PAna; OAna 2 PAna, we have v(S; a; (P a; PAna) 6= v(S; a; (P a; OAna).
Example 1 represents a game with externalities across issues. For instance, the stand-
alone coalition of player 1 in issue a obtains a payo¤ of 3 if the partition in issue b is
ff1g ; f2gg while it obtains a payo¤ of 2 if the grand coalition forms in issue b.
Issues are said to be linked if there are externalities across them. Linked issues cannot
be analyzed separately and must be included in the same game.
7For notational simplicity, we use Ana, PAna and PAna instead of Anfag, PAnfag and PAnfag, and
similarly for other sets throughout this paper.
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The objective of this paper is to propose a way to share the surplus generated when
players cooperate in an issue-externality game. We formalize the proposed division
through a value. A value  species the payo¤to players inN for any game (N;A; v), that
is, a value  is a function from the set of games G to RjN j such thatPi2N i (N;A; v) =P
a2A v(N ; a;N
jAj). Note that we incorporate the e¢ ciency axiom into the denition of
the value. We have in mind those economic environments where e¢ ciency requires that all
players cooperate on all the issues, that is,
P
a2A v(N ; a;N
jAj) Pa2APS2Pa v(S; a;PA)
for every vector of partitions PA.
3 A Value for Games with Externalities within and
across Issues
The class of issue-externality games G that we consider is quite large, encompassing
partition function games as a special class. Recall that a partition function game is a pair
(N; u); where u is a function that associates a real number with each pair (S; P ); with
S 2 P; P 2 P. That is, u : ECL(N) ! R where ECL(N)  f(S; P ) j S 2 P; P 2 Pg.
Thus, a partition function game represents a situation where players are concerned with
a single issue, although the representation abstracts away from the identity of the issue.8
A natural generalization of this property to issue-externality games is that a solution
concept does not depend on how issues are labelled or identied, which we shall refer to
as issue symmetry, reminiscent of player anonymity. Once this axiom is invoked, we
can represent partition function games as special cases of issue-externality games. More
precisely, let PFG be the set of partition function games and denote by  a particular
issue. Then PFG can be viewed as a collection of issue-externality games with a single
issue, that is, A = fg ; by dening v(S;;P )  u(S; P ) for every (S;;P ) 2 ECL(N;).
Therefore, the value  dened for G also constitutes a value for PFG . Given that PFG
encompasses the class of characteristic function games as a special case,  dened for G
immediately provides a value for games in characteristic function form.
8Consequently, all solution concepts, including values, for this game depend only on the information
embedded in (N;u); not on the identity of the issue under consideration.
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The Shapley value is one of the most important value solutions for games in charac-
teristic form. One natural way to dene a value concept for PFG is to extend the Shapley
value to PFG : There have been several such extensions in the literature. In the same
vein, we propose value concepts for G by extending values dened for PFG to our broader
class of games G.
We consider a particular value  dened for PFG . We build a value concept for G
that treats externalities across issues (i.e., inter-issue externalities) in a similarway as
 treats externalities within issues (i.e., intra-issue externalities). To this end, we view
the contribution of each player i 2 N as the sum of the contributions of jAj delegates
of player i, one delegate per issue. That is, we disentangle the jAj contributions of player
i as if they would come from jAj players. Then, we dene a game with a single issue and
jAj jN j delegates.Finally, we apply the value  to this new game.
Formally, we denote by N(a) the replica of the set N pertaining to issue a: A typ-
ical player, coalition, and partition with respect to issue a shall be identied as i(a);
S(a); and P (a), respectively. Also, we use N(A) to denote the union of all replicas
of N , that is, N(A) = [
a2A
N(a); hence, N(A) has jAj jN j players. For example, if
N = f1; 2; 3g and A = fa; bg ; then N(a) = f1(a); 2(a); 3(a)g ; N(b) = f1(b); 2(b); 3(b)g ;
and N(A) = f1(a); 2(a); 3(a); 1(b); 2(b); 3(b)g : For a coalition T  N(A); we denote
T (a)  T \N(a): Similarly, the partition obtained by the intersection of N(a) with the el-
ements of a partition Q of N(A) is denoted by Q(a), that is, Q(a) = fT (a) j T 2 Qg: Q(a)
is the partition ofN(a) as induced byQ: In our previous example, if T = f2(a); 2(b); 3(b)g ;
then T (b) = f2(b); 3(b)g and if Q = ff2(a); 2(b); 3(b)g ; f1(a); 3(a); 1(b)gg ; then Q(b) =
ff2(b); 3(b)g ; f1(b)gg : Finally, for T  N(A); eT (a)  fi 2 N j i(a) 2 T (a)g is the set of
players whose a replicas are in T , and for each a 2 A, eQ(a)  feT (a) j T 2 Qg is the
partition of N on issue a as induced by Q, for every partition Q of N(A).
Denition 3 Given a game (N;A; v), we dene the partition function game (N(A); v^)
as follows:
v^(T;Q) 
X
a2A
v
eT (a); a; eQ(b)
b2A

(1)
for any (T;Q) 2 ECL(N(A)); that is, for any partition Q of N(A) and any coalition
T 2 Q.
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We can think of bas an operator that transforms a function from ECL(N;A) to R
to a function from ECL(N(A)) to R. Such a transformation turns a game with multiple
linked issues to a game with a single issue where the value of any coalition T  N(A) can
depend on the organization Q of all the agents.
Once (N; a; v) is transformed to (N(A); v^); we can apply the value  to this game
and k(N(A); v^) is the payo¤ for any player k 2 N(A). Notice thatX
k2N(A)
k(N(A); v^) = v^(N(A); fN(A)g) =
X
a2A
v( eN(a); a; ( eN(b))b2A) =X
a2A
v(N ; a;N jAj):
(2)
Then, we consider the sharing rule  for (N;A; v) obtained by summing, for every
player i 2 N , the payo¤ that all his replicas (delegates) i(a) 2 N(a) obtain. That is,
Denition 4 Given a value  for PFG, we dene the value  for the class of games
G as:
i (N;A; v) 
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^)
for any game (N;A; v) 2 G:
It is immediate from (2) that the value  is e¢ cient as long as  is e¢ cient. We will
consider values  for PFG that extend the original Shapley value and we will examine
the properties or axioms that characterize the denition of  as given above. In the next
section, we propose a list of reasonable axioms to impose on a value.
4 Axioms
We start the section with the axioms underlying the construction of the Shapley value
for games in characteristic form. We adapt these axioms to the class of issue-externality
games G. We rst dene the operations of addition and multiplication by a scalar, and
the notions of permutation of games and dummy player.
Denition 5 The addition of two games (N;A; v) and (N;A; v0) is dened as the game
(N;A; v + v0) where (v + v0)(S; a;PA) = v(S; a;PA) + v0(S; a;PA) for all (S; a;PA) 2
ECL(N;A). Similarly, given a game (N;A; v) and a scalar  2 R, the game (N;A; v) is
dened by (v)(S; a;PA) = v(S; a;PA) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A).
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Let N : N ! N be a permutation of N . For S  N; let N(S) = f(i) j i 2 Sg
and for partition P a on issue a 2 A; let N(P a) = f(S) j S 2 P a): Furthermore, for any
payo¤ vector x 2 <jN j; Nx is the payo¤ vector such that (Nx)i = x 1N (i) for all i 2 N:
Denition 6 For any permutation N of N , the N permutation of the game (N;A; v);
denoted by (N;A; Nv); is dened by (Nv)(S; a;PA) = v( 1N (S); a;
 1
N (P
A)) for all
(S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A); where  1N (PA) = ( 1N (P a))a2A.
Denition 7 Player j 2 N is a dummy player in the game (N;A; v) if for any (S; a;PA) 2
ECL(N;A) it is the case that v(S; a;PA) = v(S 0; a;OA) for any embedded coalition
(S 0; a;OA) that can be deduced from (S; a;PA) by solely changing the a¢ liation of player
j in some issues.
Hence, a dummy player j has no e¤ect in the game: in any issue a (i) he alone receives
zero for any organization of the other players; (ii) he has no e¤ect on the worth of any
coalition S; (iii) if player j is not a member of S, changing the organization of players
outside S in issue a by moving player j around will not a¤ect the worth of S, and (iv)
changing the a¢ liation of player j in any issue other than a does not change the worth
of any coalition formed on issue a.
We adapt the three original Shapley (1953) value axioms to our environment:
1. Linearity: A value  satises the linearity axiom if:
1:1:  (N;A; v + v0) =  (N;A; v) +  (N;A; v0) for any two games (N;A; v) and
(N;A; v0) in G.
1:2:  (N;A; v) =  (N;A; v) for any  2 R and for any game (N;A; v) in G.9
One of the implications of linearity is that when a group of players face two issue-
externality games with the same set of issues, each players payo¤ does not depend on
whether they consider the two games separately or they simply analyze a combined
9In games without any type of externalities, additivity (part 1:1), dummy and anonymity axioms imply
the property on the multiplication for a scalar (part 1:2). As shown in Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2007), in games with externalities within an issue there are values that are additive but
not linear, that is, they satisfy part 1:1 (and the other basic axioms) but not part 1:2.
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game. Following Myerson (1991, p. 437-438), an alternative interpretation is that players
are uncertain of the issue-externality games they are going to play and the linearity axiom
asserts that playersexpected payo¤s are the same whether they analyze the game before
or after the uncertainty is resolved.
2. Player anonymity: A value  satises the player anonymity axiom if for any
game (N;A; v) in G and for any permutation N : N ! N;  (N;A; Nv) =
N (N;A; v) :
This axiom can be replaced by the following stronger version. Let M be such that
jM j = jN j and let NM be a bijection from the setN to the setM: (M;A; NMv) is a game
dened by NMv(S; a;PA) = v( 1NM(S); a;
 1
NM(P
A)) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(M;A):
2. Player anonymity: A value  satises the player anonymity axiom if for any
game (N;A; v) in G and for any bijection NM : N ! M ,  (M;A; NMv) =
NM (N;A; v) :
3. Dummy player : A value  satises the dummy player axiom if, for any game
(N;A; v) in G, j (N;A; v) = 0 if player j is a dummy player in the game (N;A; v).
Next, we consider an axiom that reects ideas akin to player anonymity but with
respect to the issue: the name of the issue should not inuence the payo¤s players obtain
in a game. We shall refer to this axiom as issue symmetry.10
4 Issue symmetry: A value  satises the issue symmetry axiom if, for any two games
(N; fag; v) and (N; fbg; v0); if v0(S; b;P ) = v(S; a;P ) for any P 2 P and S 2 P ,
then  (N; fag; v) =  (N; fbg; v0).
Thus, issue symmetry states that in a game with a single issue, renaming the issue
alone does not change the value, that is,  depends on the game (N; fag; v) through v:11
Once the axiom of issue symmetry is invoked, PFG can be viewed as a special class of
10For games in characteristic form, symmetry and anonymity are synonymous. In our environment we
shall use anonymity to refer to properties for players and symmetry for issues.
11In fact, this axiom can be replaced by a stronger version. Let A and B be two sets of issues such
that jAj = jBj and let AB be a bijection from the set A to the set B: Then the AB renaming of
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single-issue games in G; moreover, by restricting axioms 1-3 to these single-issue games, we
recover these axioms for PFG as well as characteristic function games, which constitute
a special case of PFG .
Axioms 1-3 characterize a unique value in characteristic function form games (Shapley,
1953). Let (N;w) be a game in characteristic function form, where w : 2N ! R is the
characteristic function. The Shapley value ' is then given by
'i(w) =
X
SN
i(S)w(S) =
X
SN
S3i
i(S)MCi(S) for all i 2 N , (3)
where MCi(S) is the marginal contribution of player i 2 S to coalition S; that is,
MCi(S)  w(S)  w(Snfig) and
i(S) =
8<:
(jSj 1)!(n jSj)!
n!
for all S  N such that i 2 S
  jSj!(n jSj 1)!
n!
for all S  N such that i 2 NnS:
The three basic Shapley value axioms are compatible with many values dened for
PFG and they leave even more leeway regarding values for issue-externality games. We
now discuss some other axioms that allow us to give more structure to values in this large
class of games.
First, we introduce a stronger dummy axiom that is implied by the previous three
axioms in characteristic function games. Hence, it is satised by the Shapley value dened
for this class of games but is a more demanding property than the dummy axiom when
we enlarge the domain of games under consideration.
3 Strong dummy player : A value  satises the strong dummy player axiom if, for
any game (N;A; v), i (Nnj; A; v j) = i (N;A; v) for all i 2 Nnj if j is a dummy
player in game (N;A; v); where v j(S; a;PA)  v(S [ j; a;PA+j) for all (S; a;PA) 2
ECL(Nnj; A); and PA+j; with S [ j 2 P a+j, is similar to PA except that player j is
a¢ liated with some coalition in P b for any issue b.
issues in game (N;A; v) denoted by (N;ABA;ABv) = (N;B; ABv) is dened by (ABv)(S; b;P
B) =
v(S; 1AB(b);
 1
ABP
B) for all (S; b;PB) 2 ECL(N;B); where  1ABPB applies the bijection  1AB to the
components of the vector of partitions PB . A value  satises the (stronger version of) issue symmetry
axiom if  (N;ABA;ABv) =  (N;A; v) for all AB renaming of issues in (N;A; v).
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The strong dummy axiom states that when a dummy player is added or removed from
a game, the payo¤s of the remaining players do not change. This property is not satised
by all the proposals for games with externalities within issues. The values proposed
by Myerson (1977), Feldman (1996), Macho-Stadler et al. (2007), Pham Do and Norde
(2007), de Clippel and Serrano (2008), and McQuillin (2009) satisfy the strong dummy
player axiom;12 in contrast, those of Bolger (1989) and Albizuri et al. (2005) do not.13
We now consider an axiom that reects ideas akin to dummy player axioms but with
respect to issues. The elimination of an issue that generates neither worth nor externalities
should not change playerspayo¤s. We shall refer to this axiom as dummy issue. To
formulate this axiom, we need to dene the notion of dummy issue. Issue d 2 A is a
dummy issue in the game (N;A; v) if v(S; d;PA) = 0 for all PA 2 PA and all S 2 P a
and v(S; a;
 
P d; PAnd

) = v(S; a;
 
Od; PAnd

) for all a 6= d, P d; Od 2 P ; PAnd 2 PAnd; and
S 2 P a: Hence, no coalition can obtain any worth in a dummy issue, and the organization
of the players in a dummy issue has no e¤ect on the worth of any coalition in any other
issue.
5 Dummy issue: A value  satises the dummy issue axiom if for any game (N;A; v)
in G,  (N;And; v d) =  (N;A; v) where d is a dummy issue in (N;A; v) and
v d(S; a;PAnd)  v
 
S; a;
 
P d; PAnd

for any (S; a;PAnd) 2 ECL(N;And) and any
partition P d of N .
Finally, we introduce two axioms that capture how cross-issue externalities are dealt
with. The rst is an axiom of anonymity on externalities across issues; it ensures that
externalities across issues are treated in such a way that a players payo¤does not depend
on the identities of the players exerting the cross-issue externalities; rather, it depends
only on the extent of these externalities.
12Among the values based on the average approach dened in Macho-Stadler et al. (2007), some
satisfy the strong dummy player axiom while others do not. To illustrate this, note that all the values
just mentioned but Myersons are in the family of the average approach. To show that there are some
values that do not satisfy the axiom let us dene the value alternate, which consists of applying a value
in the class of average values (for example, the value proposed by Macho-Stadler et al., 2007) to games
with an odd number of players and another one (for example the one by de Clippel and Serrano, 2008)
to games with an even number of players.
13These two values are not in the family of values that satisfy the average approach.
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6 Issue-externality anonymity: A value  satises the issue-externality anonymity ax-
iom if for any game (N;A; v) in G and any i 2 N , it is the case that i (N;A; vN ) =
i (N;A; v) for all permutations N that satisfy N(i) = i, where vN (S; a;P
A) 
v(S; a;
 
P a; OAna

) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A); and for all b 2 Ana either
Ob = NP
b or Ob = P b.
In the presence of cross-issue externality, a coalitions worth in issue a also depends
on P b; where b 2 Ana: When the names or roles of two players in P b for some b 2 Ana
are interchanged, how does this a¤ect the payo¤ of a player i (whose name stays the
same across di¤erent issues) through the channel of cross-issue externalities? The issue-
externality anonymity stipulates that player is payo¤ should not change, i.e., player is
payo¤ does not depend on the identities of the players who exert cross-issue externalities.
The issue-externality anonymity axiom di¤ers from player anonymity axiom as the latter
axiom stipulates that playerspayo¤s do not depend on the specic names they have in
the entire game.
The second axiom pertaining to cross-issue externalities is an axiom of symmetry
among issues where externalities are created. A players payo¤ should not depend on the
name of the issue from which externalities originate. More precisely, consider a set of
players M whose only role in the game is to induce externalities on others through their
organization on one of the issues. Our issue-externality symmetry axiom then says that
playerspayo¤s depend only on the extent of these externalities not on the issue from
which players in M exert their externalities. To formulate this axiom, we rst dene the
concept of externality players on a single issue.
Denition 8 Let a 2 A. M  N is a set of a-externality players if v(S; b;PA) =
v(T ; b;QA) for all (S; b;PA); (T ; b;QA) 2 ECL(N;A) such that14
(i) Qc \ (NnM) = P c \ (NnM) for all c 2 A;
(ii) Qa \M = P a \M; and
(iii) SnM = TnM:
14For P 2 P and S  N; P \ S is the partition on the set S obtained from P by removing the players
in N n S:
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Thus, players in M a¤ect any coalitions worth only through their organization on
issue a, and the externalities M generates do not interact with those by NnM: Moreover,
no player in M can add to the worth of any coalition. The next axiom says that if we
transferthe externalities exerted by M from issue a to another issue b; playerspayo¤s
should not change. To state the axiom, we use the following denition:
Denition 9 Given a game (N;A; v) and a setM of a-externality players, the game vM;ab
is the transformation of game v by moving the externalities induced by M from issue a
to issue b, that is, vM;ab(S; c;PA)  v(T ; c;OA) for all (S; c;PA) 2 ECL(N;A); where
OAnfag = PAnfag; Oa \ (NnM) = P a \ (NnM) ; Oa \M = P b \M; and SnM = TnM:15
7 Issue-externality symmetry: A value  satises the issue-externality symmetry ax-
iom if for any game (N;A; v) in G; i (N;A; vM;ab) = i (N;A; v) for all i 2 N , for
any a; b 2 A, and for any set M of a externality players.
5 Characterization of the Value
In Section 3 we dened a value  for the class of games G by extending a reference value
 for PFG . We now relate the properties of these two values. Note that axioms for
PFG can be obtained by restricting axioms dened in Section 3 to single-issue games in
G. First we show that the value  satises a series of properties related to those satised
by the reference value . Proposition 1 states that the classic axioms of linearity, player
anonymity, dummy player, and strong dummy player can be extended from  to :
Proposition 1 (i) If  satises the linearity axiom in PFG, then  satises the lin-
earity axiom in G.
(ii) If  satises the player anonymity axiom in PFG, then  satises the player
anonymity axiom in G.
(iii) If  satises the dummy player axiom in PFG, then  satises the dummy player
15Note that for each c 6= a; if S 2 P c; then S 2 Oc. However, it is possible that S 2 P a and S =2 Oa:
In the original game, M exerts externalities through Oa \M while in the transformed game, M exerts
externalities through P b \M:
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axiom in G.
(iv) If  satises the strong dummy player in PFG, then  satises the strong dummy
player axiom in G.
Proposition 2 shows that when the reference value  satises the strong dummy player
axiom, then the properties of dummy issue and issue symmetry, which extend to issues
the ideas of dummy player and player symmetry, are satised by the value .
Proposition 2 (i)  satises the issue symmetry axiom in G.
(ii) If  satises the strong dummy player axiom in PFG, then  satises the dummy
issue axiom in G.
Finally, Proposition 3 states that the two axioms that capture the way inter-issue
externalities are considered are also satised given the construction of the value , as
long as the reference value  satises the classic axioms of linearity and player anonymity.
Proposition 3 (i) If  satises linearity and player anonymity in PFG, then  satises
the issue-externality anonymity axiom in G.
(ii) If  satises player anonymity in PFG, then  satises the issue-externality sym-
metry axiom in G.
Propositions 1 to 3 show that if we construct a value  for the class of issue-externality
games by the procedure proposed in Denition 3, starting with a value  for PFG that
satises the axioms of linearity, player anonymity, and strong dummy player, then the
seven axioms that we formulated in Section 4 hold for the value . Our main result
shows that the converse is also true. That is, if a value  for G satises the seven axioms,
then it can be constructed through the proposed procedure, using a reference value  for
PFG that satises the axioms of linearity, player anonymity, and strong dummy player.
Theorem 1 A value  in G satises the axioms of linearity, player anonymity, strong
dummy player, issue symmetry, dummy issue, issue-externality anonymity, and issue-
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externality symmetry16, if and only if there exists a value  in PFG that satises linearity,
player anonymity, and strong dummy player such that
i(N;A; v) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^)
for any game (N;A; v) and any player i 2 N , where
v^(T;Q) 
X
a2A
v(eT (a); a; ( eQ(b))b2A)
for any partition Q of N(A) and any coalition T 2 Q.
We need only to prove the necessity part of Theorem 1. The detailed proof is relegated
the appendix and its structure is outlined as follows: We rst use additivity to decom-
posean issue-externalty game (N;A; v) into a collection of games f(N;A; va)ga2A, where
in each (N;A; va) any coalition can only obtain non-zero worth in issue a: For each such
game (N;A; va), we make use of strong dummy player axiom by adding replicas of each
player, one per issue, to the game. We then appeal to issue-externality anonymity to
encodethe cross-issue externalities in any issue b 2 A so that they are exerted by the
b replicas of the players. Next, by using issue-externality symmetry we encode all the
externalities to issue a, knowing that b replicas of the players are the set of b externality
players. After eliminating the dummy issues, we end up with a partition function game.
The structure of the proof makes it easy to see the role each axiom plays.
Another property that our value concept satises is independence. To formulate this
axiom, we rst dene the union of two issue-externality games. The union of (N;A; v)
16Note that issue-externality anonymity, issue-externality symmetry, and dummy issues are the key
new axioms that are specic to our issue-externality games and they become superuous in games with
a single issue (corresponding to partition function games). As we shall see, these three axioms enable us
to transforman issue-externality game to a partition-function game, based on which our value concept
is dened. To see, for example, that issue-externality symmetry axiom is independent from the rest of
axioms, consider a simple example with three-player (1,2, and 3) and two issues (a and b) where f23g
is the set of b externality players: When 2 and 3 belong to the same coalition in P b; v(S; a;PA) = 1 if
1 2 S and 0 if 1 =2 S; v(S; b;PA) = 0 for all PA: Without issue-externality symmetry, the game cannot
be reduced to a partition-function game and there are multitude of values compatible with the rest of
the axioms. With issue-externality symmetry, the value can be constructed from an auxiliary partition
function game.
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and (N;B;w) such that A \ B = ? is dened as a game (N;A [ B; v [ w) where (v [
w)(S; c;PA[B) = v(S; c;PA) if c 2 A and (v [w)(S; c;PA[B) = w(S; c;PB) if c 2 B: The
axiom of independence states that playerspayo¤s are the same whether we analyze two
games separately or the union of the two games.
8 Independence:  (N;A [B; v [ w) =  (N;A; v)+  (N;B;w) for all games (N;A; v)
and (N;B;w) such that A \B = ?:
We notice that the property of independence is an axiom related to linearity, as it
stipulates how the value should treat combinations of games with the same set of players.
Proposition 4 If a value  satises linearity and dummy issue, then it satises the
independence axiom.
It is easy to verify that the independence axiom implies the dummy issue axiom.
Therefore,
Corollary 1 Under the linearity axiom, a value  satises the dummy issue axiom if
and only if it satises the independence axiom.
However, the axiom of independence does not imply the axiom of linearity, even if
we assume e¢ ciency, player anonymity, and dummy player in addition to dummy issue.
Independence relates the values of two games with di¤erent sets of issues through an
expandedgame that contains both sets of issues. On the other hand, linearity relates
the payo¤s in two games with the same set of issues through a combinedgame where
the worth of each embedded coalition in the two games is added. The dummy issue
axiom makes it possible to use the property of linearity to delineate independence; hence,
Proposition 4 holds. Nevertheless, linearity is a strong property for the class of games with
xed set of issues that is not implied by the other axioms, even if we include independence.
The Shapley value for games with one issue is not characterized if we substitute linearity
by independence.
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To illustrate the above discussion, consider any value  for PFG satisfying e¢ ciency,
player anonymity and strong dummy player but not linearity.17 Dene now
i(N;A; v) 
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^)
as in Denition 4. The value for issue-externality games  satises e¢ ciency, player
anonymity, strong dummy player, dummy issue and independence. However, it does not
satisfy the linearity axiom.
Theorem 1 characterizes a method to construct a value for the class of issue-externality
games based on any value for PFG that satises linearity, player anonymity, and strong
dummy player. One consequence of the characterization result is that the seven axioms
mentioned in the Theorem cannot determine a unique value but a class of values. The
reason is that the axioms do not allow selecting a unique way to deal with intra-issue
externalities because they do not state properties indicating how intra-issue externalities
should be rewarded or punished. However, uniqueness of a value is important for appli-
cations. We now show that, form Theorem 1; it is possible to characterize a particular
value for issue-externality games once we extend to this class of games the properties
underlying the selected value for PFG. Indeed, once we introduce axioms stating how to
treat intra-issue externalities, Theorem 1 can be invoked to characterize a unique value
for the class of issue-externality games.
As an illustration, we present the previous procedure for the value identied in Macho-
Stadler et al. (2007):
MPWi (M;u) =
X
(S;P )2ECL(M)
T2PnS (jT j   1)!
(jM j   jSj)! i(S)u(S; P ) for all i 2M:
17For example, denote 1 the value proposed by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) and 2 the one proposed
by de Clippel and Serrano (2008). Both satisfy e¢ ciency, linearity, player anonymity, and strong dummy
player. Consider the value  dened as follows:
(N; v) = 1(N; v) if v(N)  5
(N; v) = 2(N; v) if v(N) > 5:
It is immediate that the value  satises e¢ ciency, player anonymity, and strong dummy player, but it
does not satisfy linearity.
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The value MPW is characterized in the class of PFG by the axioms of linearity,
strong player anonymity,18 dummy player, and similar inuence. We now extend in a
straightforward way the axioms of strong player anonymity and similar inuence to issue-
externality games. Both axioms refer to intra-issue externalities.
The rst axiom strengthens player anonymity by imposing, in addition to symmetric
treatment of individual players, the symmetric treatment of externalitiesgenerated by
players. It requires that the payo¤ of a player should not change after permutations
in the set of players NnS in issue a, for any embedded coalition (S; a; P ). Formally,
given an embedded coalition
 
S; a; PA

, we denote by S;a;PaP a a new partition such
that S 2 S;a;PaP a, and the other coalitions in issue a result from a permutation of the
set NnS applied to P anS. That is, after the permutation S;a;PaP a, the partitions for
the issues di¤erent from a remain unchanged and, in issue a, only the players outside
S are reorganized in sets whose size distribution is the same as in P anS. Given the
permutation S;a;PaP a, the permutation of the game v denoted by S;a;Pav is dened
by S;a;Pav
 
S; a; PA
  v  S; a;  PAna; S;a;PaP a ; S;a;Pav  S; a;  PAna; S;a;PaP a 
v
 
S; a; PA

; and S;a;Pav
 
R; b;QA
  v  R; b;QA for all v  R; b;QA 2 ECL(N;A; v)n 
S; a; PA

;
 
PAna; S;a;PaP a
	
:
9 Strong player anonymity: A value  satises the strong player anonymity axiom if
it satises player anonymity and for any game (N;A; v) in G;  (N;A; S;a;Pv) =
 (N;A; v) for any
 
S; a; PA
 2 ECL(N;A; v).19
Finally, the similar inuence axiom states that if the only di¤erence between two
games is that a pair of players generates an externality within an issue in the rst game
when they are together whereas they generate a similar externality in the same issue
in the second game when they are separated, then these two players should obtain the
18In Macho-Stadler et al. (2007), the strong player anonymityaxiom was called the strong symme-
tryaxiom.
19In Macho-Stadler et al. (2007), it is proven that the strong player anonymity axiom, together
with linearity and dummy player, leads to a natural method of constructing a solution, that is called the
average approach: each coalition is associated a worth that is some average of what the coalition can
obtain in the di¤erent scenarios, and then it allocates to each player her Shapley value in this average
game.
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same payo¤s in both games. Formally, we say that a pair of di¤erent players i and j
has similar inuence in games (N;A; v) and (N;A; v0) if v(T; b;QA) = v0(T; b;QA) for all
(T; b;QA) 2 ECLnf(S; a; PA); (S; a; PA0)g; v(S; a; PA) = v0(S; a; PA0); and v(S; a; PA0) =
v0(S; a; PA); where the only di¤erence between the vectors of partitions PA and PA0 is
that fig; fjg 2 P anS while fi; jg 2 P a0nS.
10. Similar inuence: A value  satises the similar inuence axiom if for any two games
(N;A; v) and (N;A; v0) and for any pair of players fi; jg that has similar inuence
in those games, we have i(N;A; v) = i(N;A; v0) and j(N;A; v) = j(N;A; v0):
Proposition 5 characterizes the value for the class of games with externalities within
and across issues that satises the strong player anonymity and similar inuence axioms.
The proof of the proposition follows from our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Macho-Stadler
et al. (2007). We also use Proposition 2 in the latter, where it is shown that the strong
dummy player axiom is implied by dummy player together with the other axioms.
Proposition 5 A value  in G satises the axioms of linearity, strong player anonymity,
dummy player, similar inuence, issue symmetry, dummy issue, issue-externality anonymity,
and issue-externality symmetry, if and only if
i(N;A; v) = 
MPW
i (N;A; v) 
X
a2A
MPWi(a) (N(A); v^)
for any game (N;A; v) and any player i 2 N .
6 Two Examples
Example 1. Consider a duopoly competing in two markets, a and b (see Bulow et
al., 1985, and Nax, 2014). Suppose that the two rms have the option to merge their
operations in one or both markets. The rmsprots depend on the market structures in
both markets according to the payo¤s given in Figure 1 (see Section 2). Then, we cannot
analyze the two markets separately because they are linked; that is, there are externalities
across the two markets. It is also inappropriate to add up the worth in the two markets.
We use the MPW (M;u) and MPW .
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In our example, M = N(A) = f1(a); 2(a); 1(b); 2(b)g and v^ is determined by equation
(1). A straightforward computation yields
MPW1(a) = 3:25; 
MPW
2(a) = 3:25; 
MPW
1(b) = 2:50; 
MPW
2(b) = 4:00;
implying that in this game, the two rms share total prots from merging in both markets
as follows:
MPW1 = 5:75;
MPW
2 = 7:25:
Example 2. The class of issue-externality games G, and the value that we propose,
can accommodate situations where players meet sequentially. For example, players can
meet and form coalitions at date t = 1 (issue a), meet again at date t = 2 (issue b), and
the worth of the coalitions at t = 2 depends on the partition formed at t = 1. We can
even consider situations where new players are active or not at t = 2 (that is, in issue
b) depending on the coalitions formed at t = 1 (that is, in issue a). For example, at
t = 1 players 1 and 2 may form a coalition or not. If they form a coalition, then player
3 participates at t = 2; if players 1 and 2 do not form a coalition, then players 1 and 2
are the only ones creating worth in issue b. This situation can be formalized as a game
with three players and two issues where player 3 does not inuence payo¤s in issue a and,
if players 1 and 2 do not form a coalition at t = 1, player 3 also does not generate any
worth in issue b.
The payo¤s in Figure 2 may represent such a situation. Firms 1 and 2 are initially
active in the market. Firm 3 only exists if rms 1 and 2 form a coalition in issue a (that
is, at t = 1). Therefore, the worth of any (embedded) coalition in issue a does not change
if player 3 is added to or removed from it. The same holds for issue b if players 1 and 2
belong to di¤erent coalitions in issue a. On the other hand, if rms 1 and 2 are together
in issue a, then rm 3 is an active player in issue b and can inuence the worth obtained
when he forms coalitions with either of the two players, or with both of them.
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t = 2! f1g; f2g; f3g f1g; f2; 3g f1; 3g; f2g f1; 2g; f3g f1; 2; 3g
# t = 1
5; 5; 0 5; 5 5; 5 8; 0 8
f1g; f2g; f3g 5; 5; 0 5; 5; 0 5; 5; 0 5; 5; 0 5; 5; 0
5; 5; 0 5; 5 5; 5 8; 0 8
f1g; f2; 3g 5; 5 5; 5 5; 5 5; 5 5; 5
5; 5; 0 5; 5 5; 5 8; 0 8
f1; 3g; f2g 5; 5 5; 5 5; 5 5; 5 5; 5
4; 4; 4 2; 12 12; 2 10; 6 25
f1; 2g; f3g 12; 0 12; 0 12; 0 12; 0 12; 0
4; 4; 4 2; 12 12; 2 10; 6 25
f1; 2; 3g 12 12 12 12 12
Table 2: Example 2
In Example 2, the value generated by the grand coalition is 37 and, according to the
proposal MPW , must be shared as
MPW1(a) = 
MPW
2(a) = 9:521; 
MPW
3(a) = 0
MPW1(b) = 
MPW
2(b) = 6:333; 
MPW
3(b) = 5:292,
which implies the following total payo¤s:
MPW1 = 
MPW
2 = 15:854; 
MPW
3 = 5; 292.
Our proposal allows us to compute the payo¤ allocation from playerscontributions
in the di¤erent issues. The delegates of rms 1 and 2 in issue a obtain a total of
MPW1(a) +
MPW
2(a) = 19:042, which is higher than the worth of 12 that they generate in that
issue. Therefore, our value allocates a total worth of 7:042 to the externality that the
rmsbehavior in issue a generates on the value created in issue b.
Example 2 illustrates how to apply our values to the class of two-stage gamespro-
posed by Beja and Gilboa (1990). In these games, agents form a coalition in the rst
stage, which entitles its members to play a prespecied cooperative game at the second
stage. We can think of the rst stage as issue a (t = 1) and the second stage as issue b
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(t = 2), with the property that worth is only obtained in issue b. Beja and Gilboa (1990)
characterize all the semivalues in this class of game, where semivalues satisfy linearity,
player anonymity, dummy player, and monotonicity. Our approach provides more struc-
ture to the values by introducing axioms on the way externalities should be treated within
and across issues (in this case, across issues, between the coalitions formed at t = 1 and
the game played at t = 2); in particular, this allows us to identify the payo¤ that each
player obtains due to his participation in each stage.
For example, Beja and Gilboa (1990) consider the following majority game. There are
three players with relative weightsor vote countsof (2; 2; 3): If a coalition of at least
two players is formed at stage 1, then the players in that coalition play a majority game
to share a worth of 1. Therefore, if the coalition f1; 2g is formed, then the two players
together get 1 and each obtains a payo¤ of 0:5 if they do not form a coalition at t = 2;
if the grand coalition forms at stage 1 then at stage 2 any coalition of two player obtains
1; however, player 3 ends up with a payo¤ of 1 in the majority game at stage 2 if either
coalition f1; 3g or f2; 3g is formed at t = 1. According to the proposal MPW , the worth
of 1 must be shared as
MPW1(a) = 
MPW
2(a) = 
MPW
3(a) = 0:07777
MPW1(b) = 
MPW
2(b) = 0:17222; 
MPW
3(b) = 0:4222,
which implies playerspayo¤s of MPW1 = 
MPW
2 = 0:25 and 
MPW
3 = 0:5: The contribu-
tion of the three players to build a winning coalition in stage 1 is the same, hence they
receive the same payo¤ 0:07777 for this contribution. However, player 3 has more power
in stage 2, which is acknowledged with a payo¤ of 0:4222 compared with 0:17222 each for
players 1 and 2.
Finally, Example 2 also suggests that issue-externality games can accommodate situ-
ations with several linked issues where di¤erent players are activein each issue: the set
of players is N = Na[Nb, players in Na take a relevant decision on issue a while Nb is the
relevant set in issue b, with Na \Nb = ?. Such a situation arises when di¤erent genera-
tions of players or di¤erent sets of countries deciding on di¤erent issues with externalities
within and across them.
25
7 Conclusion
This paper considers situations where players interact in several issues and the issues are
linked because the worth of a coalition in one issue depends on the organization of the
players in the other issues. We have proposed a way to extend values that have been
put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities
both within and across issues. We have shown that any value for this class of games
satises the axioms of linearity, player anonymity, strong dummy player, issue symmetry,
dummy issue, issue-externality anonymity, and issue-externality symmetry, if and only if
the value can be obtained as an extension of a value for partition function games that
satisfy the axioms of linearity, player anonymity and strong dummy player.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Consider two games (N;A; v) and (N;A; v0). Since 
satises linearity, we have
k(N(A); v^ + bv0) = k(N(A); v^) + k(N(A); bv0) for every k 2 N(A):
Also, following (1), it is easy to check that \v + v0 = v^ + bv0. Hence,
i (N;A; v + v
0) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A);\v + v0) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^ + bv0) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^) +
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); bv0) = i (N;A; v) + i (N;A; v0)
for all i 2 N; and  satises part 1:1 of the linearity axiom. Similarly, for the multipli-
cation by an scalar  it is the case that k(N(A); v^) = 

k(N(A); v^) for every k 2 N(A)
and cv = v^: Hence,
i (N;A; v) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A);cv) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^) = 

i (N;A; v)
for all i 2 N; and  satises part 1:2 of the linearity axiom.
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(ii) The player anonymity axiom of  implies that k(N(A); v^) = 

k(N(A); v^) for
any k 2 N(A) and for any permutation  on the set N(A): Take now a permutation N
on the set N and denote N(A) the permutation on the set N(A) that associates player
i(a) to (N (i))(a); for every i 2 N; a 2 A. Consider the game (N;A; v). Then,
dNv(T;Q) =X
a2A
Nv
eT (a); a; ( eQ(b))b2A =X
a2A
v(N eT (a); a;N eQ(b))b2A =X
a2A
v((^N(A)T )(a); a;

^N(A)Q

(b))b2A

= v^(N(A)T; N(A)Q) =
 
N(A)v^

(T;Q):
Consequently,
i (N;A; Nv) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A);dNv) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); N(A)v^) =X
a2A
N(A)(i(a))(N(A); v^) =
X
a2A
(N (i))(a)(N(A); v^) = 

N (i)
(N;A; v)
for each i 2 N . Hence,  satises the player anonymity axiom.
(iii) We rst prove that if j 2 N is a dummy player in the game (N;A; v); then all
the replicas j(a); for all a 2 A; are dummy players in (N(A); v^). Consider any (T;Q) 2
ECL(N(A)) and any (T 0; Q0) obtained from (T;Q) by changing the a¢ liation of player
j(a): For any such (T 0; Q0); it is always the case that Q0(b) = Q(b) for any b 6= a; since we
are changing the a¢ liation of a player that belongs to N(a): There are two possibilities:
a) It can be the case that Q0(a) = Q(a). Then,
v^(T 0; Q0) =
X
b2A
v( eT 0(b); b; (fQ0(c))c2A) =X
b2A
v(eT (b); b; ( eQ(c))c2A) = v^(T;Q):
b) Or it can be the case that Q0(a) 6= Q(a) when j(a) changes a¢ liation. In this case,
v( eT 0(b); b; (fQ0(c))c2A) = v(eT (b); b; ( eQ(c))c2A)
for any embedded coalition (eT (b); b; ( eQ(c))c2A) and for all b 2 A because ( eT 0(b); b; (fQ0(c))c2A)
can be deduced from (eT (b); b; ( eQ(c))c2A) by changing the a¢ liation of the dummy player
j within issue a in (N;A; v): Hence again, v^(T 0; Q0) = v^(T;Q):
This ends the proof that all the replicas j(a); for all a 2 A; are dummy players in
(N(A); v^):
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If  satises the dummy player axiom, then j(a)(N(A); v^) = 0 for all a 2 A since
j(a) is a dummy player in (N(A); v^): Therefore,
j(N;A; v) =
X
a2A
j(a)(N(A); v^) = 0
and  satises the dummy player axiom.
(iv) Consider a dummy player j 2 N in the game (N;A; v) and a particular issue
a 2 A. First, since  satises the strong dummy player property and j(a) is a dummy
player in (N(A); v^);
k(N(A)nj(a); v^ j(a)) = k(N(A); v^)
for all k 2 N(A)nj(a). Second, player j(b), for b 6= a, is also a dummy player in the game
(N(A)nj(a); v^ j(a)). (If we have two dummy players in any PFG, the second dummy
player is still dummy in the game where we have eliminated the rst one.) Applying this
procedure sequentially to all the issues in A, and denoting j(A) = [
a2A
j(a), we have that
k(N(A)nj(A); v^) = k(N(A)nj(A); v^ j(A))
for all k 2 N(A)nj(A). Therefore,
i (Nnj; A; v j) =
X
a2A
i(a)((Nnj) (A); cv j) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A)nj(A); v^ j(A)) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^) = 

i (N;A; v)
for all i 2 Nnj and  satises the strong dummy player axiom.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) This property is trivially satised.
(ii) If d is a dummy issue in the game (N;A; v); then all the replicas i(d); for any
i 2 N; are dummy players in (N(A); v^); because, by the denition of dummy issue,
v^(T;Q) = v^(T 0; Q0) for all (T 0; Q0) obtained from (T;Q) by changing the a¢ liation of
player i(d); for any i 2 N .
Given that  satises the strong dummy player axiom, then if the n dummy players
i(d) are dropped o¤N(A)
k(N(A)n(i(d))i2N ; v^ (i(d))i2N ) = k(N(A); v^);
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which implies that for all i 2 N
i (N;And; v d) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(And); cv d =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A)nfi(d)gi2N ; v^ (i(d))i2N ) =X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); v^) = 

i (N;A; v)
and  satises the dummy issue axiom.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Consider the game (N;A; v) and, for any a 2 A, dene
(N;A; va) as
va(S; a;P
A)  v(S; a;PA) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A)
va(S; b;P
A)  0 for all b 2 Ana, (S; b;PA) 2 ECL(N;A):
It is immediate that v =
P
a2A va. The linearity of 
 implies the linearity of 
(Proposition 1); hence
(N;A; v) =
X
a2A
(N;A; va).
Similarly, consider the game (N;A; vN ), where N is a permutation of the set of play-
ers N . Remember that the function vN is dened as vN (S; a;P
A)  v  S; a;  P a; OAna
for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A); where Ob = NP b or Ob = P b for all b 2 Ana. Let
B  Ana be the subset of issues where N applies, i.e., Ob = NP b for all b 2 B and
Ob = P b for all b 2 AnBna. For any particular a 2 A, we dene (N;A; (vN )a) as
(vN )a (S; a;P
A)  vN (S; a;PA) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A)
(vN )a (S; b;P
A)  0 for all b 2 Ana, (S; b;PA) 2 ECL(N;A):
Given that vN =
P
a2A (vN )a, the linearity of 
 implies
(N;A; vN ) =
X
a2A
(N;A; (vN )a).
We now prove that i (N;A; (vN )a) = 

i (N;A; va) for all i 2 N for whom N(i) = i,
which will prove part (i) of the proposition.
For any i 2 N ,
i (N;A; va) =
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); bva)
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where bva(T;Q) =X
b2A
va(eT (b); b; eQ(c))c2A = va(eT (a); a; eQ(c))c2A
for any (T;Q) 2 ECL(N(A)), since the other terms in the sum are zero by construction
of the function va. Also,
i (N;A; (vN )a) =
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A);\(vN )a)
where
\(vN )a(T;Q) =
X
b2A
(vN )a (
eT (b); b; eQ(c))c2A = (vN )a (eT (a); a; eQ(c))c2A
for any (T;Q) 2 ECL(N(A)). We notice that, by denition of vN , (vN )a (S; a;PA) =
v(S; a;
 
P a; OAna

) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A); where Ob = NP b or Ob = P b for all
b 2 Ana (and (vN )a (S; b;PA) = 0 for all b 2 Ana, (S; b;PA) 2 ECL(N;A)). Since (vN )a
only permutes the roles of the players involved in a subset of issues B  An a, \(vN )a only
permutes the roles of the players in each N(b), for all b 2 B. In fact, \(vN )a = N(A) bva,
where the permutation N(A) is as follows:
N(A)(i(c)) = i(c) for all i 2 N and all c 2 AnB:
N(A)(i(b)) = (N (i)) (b) for all i 2 N and all b 2 B.
Given that  satises player anonymity,
i(c)(N(A);\(vN )a) = 

i(c)(N(A); N(A) bva) = i(c)(N(A); bva)
for all i 2 N and c 2 AnB and
i(b)(N(A);\(vN )a) = 

(N (i))(b)
(N(A); N(A) bva) = (N (i))(b)(N(A); bva)
for all i 2 N and all b 2 B. In particular, i(b)(N(A);\(vN )a) = i(b)(N(A); bva) for all
i 2 N for whom N(i) = i. This implies that i (N;A; (vN )a) = i (N;A; va) for any
i 2 N for whom N(i) = i, and the result holds.
(ii) Consider the game (N;A; v), a set M of a externality players and b 6= a: We will
show that if  satises linearity and player anonymity in PFG, then i (N;A; vM;ab) =
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i (N;A; v) for all i 2 N . Notice that i (N;A; v) =
P
c2A
i(c)(N(A); bv); where bv(T;Q) =P
c2A
v(eT (c); c; eQ(d))d2A and i (N;A; vM;ab) = P
c2A
i(c)(N(A);[vM;ab); where[vM;ab(T;Q) =P
c2A
vM;ab(eT (c); c; eQ(d))d2A. We consider the following permutation N(A) on the set
N(A) : N(A)(i(a)) = i(b) and N(A)(i(b)) = i(a) for all i 2 M and N(A)(k) = k
otherwise. Applying the permutation N(A) to the value function bv has the same e¤ect as
going from v to vM;ab: it moves the roles of players in M from issue a to issue b. Hence,
N(A)bv = [vM;ab.
Given that the value  satises anonymity, it is the case that
i(c)(N(A);[vM;ab) = 

i(c)(N(A); N(A)bv) = N(A)(i(c))(N(A); bv):
Given that N(A) only permutes replicas of the same players (those in M), it is the case
that X
c2A
i(c)(N(A);[vM;ab) =
X
c2A
N(A)(i(c))(N(A); bv) =X
c2A
i(c)(N(A); bv)
(since N(A)(i(a))(N(A); bv) + N(A)(i(b))(N(A); bv) = i(b)(N(A); bv) + i(a)(N(A); bv) for i 2
M). Therefore, i (N;A; vM;ab) = 

i (N;A; v) as we wanted to prove.
Proof of Theorem 1. The su¢ ciency part of the Theorem is a corollary of Propo-
sitions 1, 2, and 3. We prove the necessity part through a series of steps. Take any game
(N;A; v) in G.
Step 1.- For any a 2 A, we dene the following game (N;A; va):
va(S; a;P
A)  v(S; a;PA) for all (S; a;PA) 2 ECL(N;A)
va(S; b;P
A)  0 for all b 2 Ana, (S; b;PA) 2 ECL(N;A):
That is, the worth of a coalition on issue a in the game va is the same as that in v;
however, the worth of a coalition on any other issue is zero in game va. Note that the
organization of the players on issues other than a inuences the worth of coalitions in
issue a in the game va in the same way as it does in v.
It is immediate that
v =
X
a2A
va.
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Therefore, if  satises the axiom of linearity then,
(N;A; v) =
X
a2A
(N;A; va).
Step 2.- For each (N;A; va); we now dene a related game (N(A); A; wa), which is similar
to (N;A; va) except that we add (jAj   1)n dummy players. More precisely, for each
b 2 A n a; let N(b) = fi(b) j i 2 Ng be the b replica of N and for convenience, let
N(a)  N (i.e., N(a) is the original set of players). Then the set of players in the new
game is N(A) = [b2AN(b) with N(A) nN(a) being dummy players. Therefore, for every
a 2 A, (N(A); A; wa) is dened as follows:20
wa(T ; a;Q
A)  va(eT (a); a; (fQb(a))b2A)
for all (T ; a;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A) (i.e., for all vector QA of jAj partitions of N(A) and
any T 2 Qa), and
wa(T ; b;Q
A)  va(eT (a); b; (fQb(a))b2A) = 0
for all b 2 Ana and all (T ; b;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A).
Given that  satises the axioms of strong dummy player and player anonymity (2),
we have
i(N(A); A; wa) = i(N;A; va) for all i 2 N(a) = N
i(N(A); A; wa) = 0 for all i 2 N(A)nN(a).
Step 3.- Next, for each a 2 A; we dene another game (N(A); A; za) that is related to
(N(A); A; wa) in the following sense. First, as in (N(A); A; wa), a coalition of players
obtains worth only on issue a. Second, only players in N(a) create worth. Third, the
inter-issue externalities in (N(A); A; za) are similarto those in (N(A); A; wa); however,
there is one important di¤erence: in game (N(A); A; za); the externalities originating from
each issue b 2 Ana are exerted by players in N(b); rather than by players in N(a) as in
game (N(A); A; wa). That is, the game (N(A); A; za) is dened as follows:
za(T ; a;Q
A)  wa(T ; a;RA)
20As previously done, we denote T (b) = T \N(b) for any coalition T of N(A) and Q(b) = fT \N(b) j
T 2 Qg for any partition Q of N(A); for any b 2 A.
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for all (T ; a;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A), whereRA is a vector of jAj partitions ofN(A) such that
Ra = Qa and for every b 2 Ana; Rb is obtained from Qb by exchanging the memberships
of i(a) and i(b) for each i 2 N; 21 and
za(T ; b;Q
A)  0
for all b 2 Ana and all (T ; b;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A).
Note that za(T ; a;QA) = va
eT (a); a;fQb(b)
b2A

for all (T ; a;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A).22
We claim that, by issue-externality anonymity axiom,X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); A; za) = i(N;A;wa) for all i 2 N = N(a): (4)
We prove this claim by decomposing the change from (N(A); A; wa) to (N(A); A; za) in
jN j (jAj   1) stages. In each stage, we switch the membership of some i(a) 2 N(a) with
that of i(b) 2 N(b) in the partition P b on some issue b 2 Ana. In doing so, i(b) takes the
role of i(a) in generating externalities from issue b: Note that the identities of the players
who create worth (always on issue a) remain the same. Then, by the issue-externality
anonymity axiom, the value of every player di¤erent from i(a) and i(b) should not change;
hence, the sum of the values for players i(a) and i(b) should not change either. Repeating
this argument cross issues implies that after jAj 1 stages of switching the membership of
i(a) 2 N(a) with i(b) 2 N(b) for every issue b 2 Ana; the sum of the values for all replicas
of player i remain unchanged while the value of each of the remaining players stays the
same throughout these stages. By repeating the above stages for all i(a) 2 N(a); we
complete our transformation from (N(A); A; wa) to (N(A); A; za) and obtain equation
(4).
Step 4.- For each (N(A); A; za); we now dene a related game (N(A); A; ra) such that all
externalities are generated from issue a: Recall that in (N(A); A; za); for any (T ; a;QA) 2
ECL(N(A); A), the worth of T depends only on
 
Qb(b

)b2A; moreover, only a coalition of
players in N(a) can create worth and it does so only on issue a: In fact, for each b 2 Ana;
N(b) is a set of b externality players in (N(A); A; za): We dene the game (N(A); A; ra)
by encoding the externalities exerted by N(b) for all b 2 Anb in za:
21Thus, Rb(a) = Qb(b) for all b 2 Ana:
22Recall that Qb is a partition of N(A) on issue b and Qb(b) is the partition of N(b) induced by Qb;fQb(b)
is obtained from Qb(b) by replacing each i(b) 2 N(b) with i:
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ra(T ; a;Q
A)  za(T ; a;RA)
for all (T ; a;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A) where RA is a vector of jAj partitions of N(A) such
that Ra = Qa and for every b 2 Ana; Rb is such that Rb \ N(b) = Qa \ N(b): Thus, ra
can be obtained from za from (jAj   1) steps of transformation, each involving moving
the externalities induced by N(b), for a particular b 2 Ana, from issue b to issue a.
Note that ra(T ; a;QA) = va
eT (a); a;fQa(b)
b2A

for all (T ; a;QA) 2 ECL(N(A); A).
By the issue-externality symmetry axiom,
k(N(A); A; ra) = k(N;A;wa) for all k 2 N(A):
We also note that all issues in Ana are dummy issues in (N(A); A; ra).
Step 5.- Finally, we dene game (N(A); a; sa) by eliminating the set of dummy issues Ana
in (N(A); A; ra); that is,
sa(T ; a;Q)  ra(T ; a;QA)
for any (T ; a;Q) 2 ECL(N(A); a) and any vector QA of jAj partitions of N(A) that
satises Qa = Q. By the dummy issue axiom, we have
k(N(A); a; sa) = k(N(A); A; ra) for all k 2 N(A):
Note that (N(A); a; sa) is a game with a single issue (a in this case). Therefore, we
can consider (N(A); a; sa) as a PFG, that we denote (N(A); esa). Moreover, when it is
applied to games with only one issue, the issue symmetry axiom implies that the value
 depends only on the function that gives the worth of each embedded coalition, not on
the identity of the issue itself. Thus,  also denes a value for PFG : Let  be this value.
Hence,
k(N(A); esa) = k(N(A); a; sa) for all k 2 N(A):
Therefore, Steps 1-5 allow us to obtain the following series of equalities for every i 2 N :
i(N;A; v) =
X
a2A
i(N;A; va) =
X
a2A
i(a)(N(A); A; wa) =X
a2A
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); A; za) =
X
a2A
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); A; ra) =
X
a2A
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); a; sa) =X
a2A
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); esa) =X
b2A
X
a2A
i(b)(N(A); esa):
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We now prove that v^ =
P
a2A esa: Consider any partition Q of N(A) and any coalition
T 2 Q. By construction,
esa(T ;Q) = sa(T ; a;Q) = ra(T ; a;QA);
where QA is any vector of jAj partitions of N(A) that satises Qa = Q. Also,
ra(T ; a;Q
A) = va
eT (a); a;fQa(b)
b2A

= va(eT (a); a; eQ(b)
b2A
) = v(eT (a); a; eQ(b)
b2A
):
Hence, X
a2A
esa(T ;Q) =X
a2A
v(eT (a); a; eQ(b)
b2A
) = v^(T;Q):
Finally, linearity of  implies that the value  is also linear and k(N(A); v^) =P
a2A k(N(A); esa) for all k 2 N(A): Therefore,
i(N;A; v) =
X
b2A
i(b)(N(A); v^)
which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Take two games (N;A; v) and (N;B;w); with A\B = ?,
and consider a value  that satises the dummy issue axiom. We add to the rst game
jBj dummy issues, obtaining the game (N;A[B; v0) where v0 is a characteristic function
such that
v0(S; a;PA[B) = v(S; a;PA) for all a 2 A; S 2 P a; P a 2 PA
v0(S; b;PA[B) = 0 for all b 2 B; S 2 P b; and P b 2 PB.
By the dummy issue property,  assigns the same payo¤ in both games to any player
i 2 N; i.e.,
i(N;A; v) = i(N;A [B; v0):
Similarly, if we add to the game (N;B;w) a set of jAj dummy issues, we obtain the game
(N;A [B;w0) where w0 is a characteristic function such that
w0(S; a;PA[B) = 0 for all a 2 A; S 2 P a; P a 2 PA
w0(S; b;PA[B) = w(S; b;PA) for all b 2 B; S 2 P b; and P b 2 PB.
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Again, by the dummy issue axiom, we have
i(N;B;w) = i(N;A [B;w0); for all i 2 N:
Since  satises linearity,
i(N;A [B; v0) + i(N;A [B;w0) = i(N;A [B; v0 + w0):
Finally, we notice that the game (N;A [ B; v0 + w0) is equivalent to (N;A [ B; v0 [ w0);
hence,
i(N;A; v) + i(N;B;w) = i(N;A [B; v0 [ w0)
and the independence axiom is satised.
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